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Elsevier Science refused to publish a study of IBM work-
ers that IBM sought to keep from public view. Occupa-
tional and environmental health (OEH) suffers from
the absence of a level playing field on which science
can thrive. Industry pays for a substantial portion of
OEH research. Studies done by private consulting firms
or academic institutions may be published if the results
suit the sponsoring companies, or they may be cen-
sored. OEH journals often reflect the dominance of
industry influence on research in the papers they pub-
lish, sometimes withdrawing or modifying papers in
line with industry and advertising agendas. Although
such practices are widely recognized, no fundamental
change is supported by government and industry or by
professional organizations. Key words: Elsevier; industry
influence; research; academic freedom.
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In 1985, a chemist working in the Material AnalysisDepartment at the IBM research facility in San Jose,California, wrote a memo to IBM Corporate Head-
quarters, alerting IBM officials to a cluster of cancers
that his colleagues had experienced.1 Among the
group of 12 workers in a research and development lab-
oratory, two had died of brain cancer, two had died of
lymphatic cancer, and two had died of gastrointestinal
cancers. When two more developed bone tumors and
the group’s leader later died of brain cancer, the sur-
vivors pressed hard to bring IBM’s attention to the
issue. Gary Adams, the author of the memo, said the
response of a staff doctor to his request that the com-
pany monitor its workers’ health had been to say such
a program would be a waste of time, because “workers
did not get cancer from their jobs.”2
IBM commissioned a study of brain cancer mortality
among electronics workers, to be conducted by Beall
and Delzell at the University of Alabama, Birmingham
(UAB).3 The UAB investigators under contract to IBM
have had considerable experience in conducting indus-
try-supported research over many years. The IBM Cor-
porate Mortality File cited in the study report recorded
deaths for virtually all U.S. IBM employees from 1969
to 1995. The study was reported in 1996, more than a
decade after the Adams memo was submitted to man-
agement. The study prompted the authors to state that,
“Information about specific exposures in the work envi-
ronment, such as EMF, ionizing radiation, or chemical
agents, was not available. Some of the observed associ-
ations are difficult to interpret because exposure infor-
mation pertaining to division and job groups is lack-
ing.”3 The UAB study found that mortality from brain
cancer among male electronics workers increased as
the duration of employment in “technical jobs” length-
ened. This was consistent with a trend previously
reported, that the risk of dying from brain cancer is
highest among electrical and electronics workers with
long-term work histories—specifically, those of ten
years or more—and with probable exposures to solders
and organic solvents.4 The earlier study found that the
risk of astrocytic tumors among electronics manufac-
ture and repair workers was increased tenfold among
those employed for 20 years or more.
INDUSTRY-SPONSORED RESEARCH
The problem of industry sponsorship of research is not
new. The National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH) budget has provided less
research and training funding to occupational health
and safety with each succeeding year, while at the same
time funds for biomedical research and education are
increased. Conversely, private commercial funding of
university research has expanded dramatically over the
past decades. Such funding has grown to more than $2
billion annually, making U.S. universities more
dependent on private commercial funding than ever
before.5 The extent of corporate-funded science is
troubling because, as Egilman and Rankin-Bohme have
pointed out, industry funding is accompanied by a
“substantial tradition of manipulation of evidence,
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data, and analysis, ultimately designed to maintain
favorable conditions for industry, at both the material
and ideological levels.”6
James Huff of the National Institute of Environmen-
tal Health Sciences (NIEHS) recently summarized the
current state of affairs by pointing out that the
Traditional covert influence of industry on occupa-
tional and environmental health policies has turned
brazenly overt in the last several years. More than
ever before the occupational and environmental
health community is witnessing the perverse influ-
ence and increasing control by industry interests.
Industry hires academic experts to support their
position, however tenuous and speculative, to
endorse their products and to explain and downplay
the risks to government and in public forums.
Huff named many of the nation’s scientists who partic-
ipate in these activities, specifically identifying Coleen
Beall, and Elizabeth Delzell of UAB.7
IBM ON TRIAL
In 2003, a suit against IBM involving two plaintiffs with
cancer, James Moore (with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma)
and Alida Hernandez (with breast cancer), came
before a jury in San Jose, California. In the course of
legal discovery, attorneys for the plaintiffs asked for
employee records. The court granted access to the
same Corporate Mortality File that IBM had provided
to UAB investigators for their earlier study.3 IBM
attempted to block plaintiffs’ attorneys access to the
file, maintaining that it contained no helpful data, but
was overruled. 
Once access was granted, attorneys for the plaintiffs
asked epidemiologists Richard Clapp of Boston Uni-
versity School of Public Health and Rebecca Johnson of
Epi Center, Inc., to study the IBM Corporate Mortality
File. Clapp and Johnson found patterns of mortality in
the IBM workforce consistent with occupational expo-
sures to solvents and other carcinogenic materials used
in IBM manufacturing processes. The files contained
data on decedents between 1969 and early 2001. The
final number of records used for analysis, 31,961,
included records for 27,288 males and 4,673 females.
There had been 7,703 cancer deaths in men, where
7,208 would have been expected (PMR = 106.9; 95% CI
= 104.9–108.9, 99% CI = 104.2–109.6). Among the
females there were 1,668 cancer deaths, compared with
1,455 expected (PMR = 114.6; 95% CI = 110.3–119.2;
99% CI = 108.9–120.6). Proportionate mortality ratios
(PMRs) for all sites were found to be significantly ele-
vated when the IBM workers were compared with the
U.S. population. There was excess mortality in IBM
males due to cancers of the large intestine, pancreas,
kidney, testis, thyroid, central nervous system, and all
lymphatic and hematopoietic tissues, and melanoma.
In females, there was excess mortality due to cancers of
the lungs and bronchus, breast, other female organs,
and central nervous system, and all lymphatic and
hematopoietic tissues. The types of cancers that
increased the most were consistent with the findings of
other studies of semiconductor workers and studies of
workers in other industries exposed to the same chem-
icals. Key findings were the excess deaths due to brain,
breast, kidney, lymphatic, and hematopoietic cancers
and melanoma.8,9
After pretrial hearings and a review of Clapp’s dec-
larations, Judge Robert A. Baines ruled that the analy-
sis of IBM’s Corporate Mortality File data contained in
Dr. Clapp’s public Court declarations was inadmissible
as evidence in the trial: “This same study, again, assum-
ing that it is a valid study, could be used to show any
number of things, such as if . . . everyone in manufac-
turing drank coffee in the company cafeteria . . . coffee
served in the company lunch-room causes cancer.”10
In an editorial in Science, Donald Kennedy stated
that, “The judge refused to admit these findings, call-
ing them irrelevant and prejudicial, thus combining a
scientific judgment with a legal one.”11 IBM executive
Scott R. Brooks responded with a letter stating that
It is disturbing that a reputable journal like Science
would allow itself to be used as a mouthpiece for lit-
igation advocates whose position seems to be that
‘academic freedom’ trumps court orders and justi-
fies misappropriation of data, and that litigation-
generated studies of woefully inadequate and
incomplete data are a valuable contribution to sci-
entific knowledge. Your readers deserved better.”12
The comments by the judge and by IBM cannot be
justified. Clapp and Johnson’s analysis helped estab-
lish associations between work at IBM and the devel-
opment of some cancers, crucial to the plaintiffs’ case,
given that IBM has consistently denied any such asso-
ciation. The analysis also revealed that IBM had failed
to disclose evidence of risks to IBM workers, while at
the same time maintaining a Corporate Mortality File
that included relevant data and was the best available
dataset from which to determine whether the claims
by the plaintiffs against IBM were correct. Given that
the premise of the plaintiffs’ claim was corporate fraud
and concealment (one of the few bases for workers to
sue their employers rather than be limited to no-fault
workers’ compensation as a remedy), exclusion of
these data from the jury’s deliberations was of critical
importance. After losing the case, a plaintiffs’ attorney
said that the prohibition of using Clapp’s analysis of
IBM’s Corporate Mortality File data in the trial had
meant that, “I fought the case with one hand tied
behind my back.”13 Soon thereafter, IBM announced
that it had settled all the outstanding lawsuits with over
50 current and former California workers for an undis-
closed sum. 
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IBM AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
In a move that upset IBM, Clapp submitted his analysis
for inclusion in a special issue of the scholarly journal,
Clinics in Occupational and Environmental Medicine,
devoted to the electronics industry. IBM lawyers sent a
letter cautioning Clapp not to publish the details of his
analysis, stating that it was protected by a court order
guaranteeing its confidentiality—despite the public
availability of Clapp and Johnson’s overall findings in
court records.14,15
In normal circumstances, the matter would have
ended there, but Clapp was not finished. He called Joe
LaDou who was Guest Editor of the Clinics special issue
to report that he had engaged a private attorney, who
had advised him that he could proceed with the
planned publication. According to his lawyer, Indira
Talwani, of Segal, Roitman & Coleman, in Boston,
Clapp had the legal right to publish his research find-
ings. One basis for her conclusion was that, for all their
sword-rattling after the fact, IBM’s lawyers had failed to
seal a lengthy deposition taken in the San Jose case that
contained his analyses as marked exhibits. Further-
more, the controversial paper was in the public
domain, with some of its findings being cited in the
New York Times in columns by Bob Herbert.16,17
As news of Clapp’s temerity became public, IBM
lawyers went beyond the statement of legal prohibi-
tions, becoming increasingly strident with their com-
ments to the media. The Wall Street Journal reported
that IBM lawyers labeled the analysis “junk science.”18
Robert Weber, the lead defense counsel in the San Jose
case, carried the slur to its extreme, asserting that the
Clapp study, “gives junk science a bad name.”19 Robert
Weber is now a senior executive at IBM, having left the
Jones & Day law firm.
In a letter to Science, IBM’s Scott R. Brooks said that
Clapp’s data are, “incomplete and inadequate for reli-
able study.”18 Clapp disputed this by saying that the
data he received from IBM were close to 100% com-
plete, and that IBM’s own research contractors at UAB
had published a previous article using the same
dataset.20 One of IBM’s attorneys, from the Washing-
ton, D.C., office of Jones & Day, said that, “It is a phony,
litigation-driven study,” adding, “This isn’t peer-
reviewed, it isn’t published, and it wouldn’t qualify for
publication in any legitimate scientific journal.”10
The case was widely reported in the news media, as
were some of the findings of the Clapp and Johnson
study, leading IBM to respond that, “In a workforce as
large as IBM’s, many workers will, by simple chance, con-
tract unusual diseases.”21 “There’s no evidence that any
workers’ illnesses were caused by their work at IBM.”22
New York Times columnist, Bob Herbert, wrote that, “Rep-
resentatives of IBM have said there’s no evidence anyone
has died from chemical exposure in the workplace and,
in background conversations, have spoken venomously
about the motives and tactics of the lawyers and others
who have gone to bat for the plaintiffs.”17
IBM lawyers warned Clapp that publishing the paper
would violate a court order specifying that the internal
IBM data be used only in litigation. IBM spokesman
Scott R. Brooks denies that IBM blocked Clapp’s study.
He is correct that IBM never went to court to block it.
But in March 2004, in a letter to plaintiffs’ attorney
Steven Phillips, IBM attorney Michael Templeton wrote
that publication of the study would represent “a misap-
propriation of data that Dr. Clapp has no right to use
for such purposes,” and that “IBM expressly reserves all
of its rights to take any appropriate action.”12 Clapp’s
attorney, Indira Talwani, calls that “a threat.” Brooks
maintains that publishing the study would violate four
court orders; Talwani, in contrast, maintains that the
study is in the public domain. Clapp, after withdrawing
his submission, told Science that if he hadn’t received
the letter from IBM’s lawyers, he would have gone
ahead and published the study in Clinics.22
IBM RETALIATES
While successfully delaying the publication of the Clapp
study, IBM retained epidemiologists at the University of
Alabama who had conducted their prior cancer study3
to do a further study of cancer risk among workers at
two IBM plants. Workers were evaluated for cause-spe-
cific mortality rates compared with general population
rates.23 The healthy-worker effect was evident in the
lower-than-expected overall mortality, but brain cancer
was again associated with semiconductor exposures,
despite the fact that the workforce was divided into
many subgroups that made it difficult to analyze indi-
vidual cancer risks. No apparent effort was made to uti-
lize the company’s industrial hygiene records of worker
exposures to a number of carcinogens.24
In November 2004, the IBM Medical Director sent a
message to employees that was simultaneously released
to the public. The message began, “Safeguarding
employee health, safety and well-being in the work-
place is core to our values and woven into every aspect
of who we are as a company. This includes rigorously
evaluating our business practices and work environ-
ments.”25 The message went on to state that prelimi-
nary evidence from the UAB study revealed that IBM
employees had fewer cancers than expected. The IBM
Medical Director failed to mention that the study
showed that length of employment was associated posi-
tively with brain cancer among IBM workers. Other
cancers with increased relative risks were leukemia,
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, ovarian cancer, and
prostate cancer.
The same group of UAB researchers then published
another paper as an additional investigation focused
on cancer incidence rather than on mortality. The
study excluded one of the IBM facilities included in the
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earlier study because it was “not feasible” to link with
the Vermont cancer registry for data on the Burlington
facility. They compared the incidence rates of cancer
for 89,054 men and women workers at IBM facilities in
East Fishkill, New York, and San Jose, California, with
general population rates. Employees had total cancer
incidence rates that were lower than the general popu-
lation rates overall and those of subgroups with many
years since starting work and relatively long durations
of employment.
These deficits reflected employees’ low incidence
rates of most cancers related to smoking, alcohol
and nutritional deficits. When compared with the
general population, some employee subgroups had
small increases in several cancers, including
melanoma of the skin and cancers of the colon,
breast, prostate, and thyroid.26
The researchers begin their paper by stating that
“Because it was not known whether semiconductor
workers have been exposed to carcinogenic agents and
because previous epidemiological studies have not pro-
vided evidence that exposures in the industry are asso-
ciated with cancer, we did not evaluate hypotheses on
specific agents and cancers as part of the present
research.” They end the paper by concluding that,
“The results of the study do not provide any strong evi-
dence of a causal association between employment fac-
tors and cancer.”26
In a Commentary in the same journal issue, K. A.
Mundt of ENVIRON International Corporation (a
global consulting firm used extensively by industry),
summarized the new study with the following comments
Although reporting a few excesses of specific can-
cers, some of which may be expected owing to
random error, the study offers some reassurance
that at this stage of follow-up no noteworthy
increases in cancer risk are seen among employees
. . . the study of the IBM semiconductor and storage
device workers seems to be negative.27
Clapp responded
I believe Mundt is being too quick here to minimize
the cancer risk in the semiconductor industry. He
gives an interpretation that is even more cautious
than the IBM consultants who did the study. Bender,
et al. at least point out that there were several
excesses that seemed to be related to exposure peri-
ods in the earliest part of the follow-up. They also
note that some of the incidence findings mirror the
findings of a previously published mortality study;
they cite the excess of brain cancer cases in mainte-
nance and repair workers in East Fishkill, for exam-
ple, a finding similar to the excess brain cancer mor-
tality in workers in this job group.
Clapp further noted,
Neither Mundt nor Bender, et al. discuss the impli-
cations of the timing of the cancer incidence
study. Because of the period of operation of the state
cancer registries in New York (1976 and after) and
California (1988 and after), and the period of
follow-up of the cohort, the study looked at a later
time interval than the mortality study by Beall, et al.
(2005); that study included deaths in the period
1965–1999 for workers in both states. My own study
on cancer in IBM employees covered deaths in the
period 1969–2001, and I was able to look at patterns
in five-year intervals and it was clear that the excess
cancer deaths were predominantly in the earlier
years: 1969–1979 in females, and 1969–1989 in
males in the IBM workforce. In fact, in males, there
was almost no overall excess cancer mortality after
1990. So, to the extent that the incidence data cap-
tured patterns in California from 1988 onward, this
was the period of little or no excess mortality and
likely the least informative potential work-related
risks. It’s like looking for the horse after it had
already run out of the barn. Mundt’s assurances that
the remaining risks are small and that not much can
be learned by further studies in this industry are
premature.28
ELSEVIER SCIENCE AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
Dr. Clapp again called Joe LaDou in his role as Guest
Editor of the Clinics issue to tell him that the Boston
University legal department had advised him that he
could proceed with the submission. Their position was
that the paper was in the public domain. LaDou sub-
mitted the paper to Elsevier Science, publishers of Clin-
ics, and shortly thereafter received a message from
Catherine Bewick of Elsevier stating that, “I expect to
be speaking with my legal department next week after
their review of the situation and I will get back to you
then.”29 Shortly thereafter she sent LaDou a brief mes-
sage, “It has been decided that we will not be able to
publish the paper by Drs. Clapp and Johnson as it is an
original research article and the Clinics in Occupa-
tional and Environmental Medicine publish only review
articles.”30 Elsevier made the same assertion to the
media and at scientific meetings in the months that fol-
lowed.18 Nothing in Elsevier’s instructions to Guest Edi-
tors (at that time) precluded articles with original
research. A review of the Clinics issues for the two years
preceding the proposed special issue on the electronics
industry reveals six original research studies.31–36
Elsevier spokesperson Eric Merkel-Sobotta, when
asked whether IBM had contacted Elsevier about the
study, said, “There’s been no coercion and no threats.”
Elsevier said its decision had nothing to do with fears
that IBM might pursue legal action against the pub-
lisher.37 IBM spokesperson Chris Andrews said that IBM
“has not contacted anyone with regards to Clapp’s intent
to publish.”15 Morris Greenberg, a revered and distin-
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guished occupational physician, remarked that the ques-
tion asked was, “Did IBM contact Elsevier about the
study? A nod is as good as a wink to a blind horse, and
threats are unnecessary when the media are prepared to
apply self censorship rather than make waves.”38
Academic freedom requires access to publication for
scientific studies whether a journal publisher likes the
content or not. If the material is worthy, and the editor
is satisfied the piece meets the journal’s scientific stan-
dards, the publisher’s interference smacks of censor-
ship or pandering to its advertisers or sponsors. Elsevier
censored the Clapp and Johnson paper after Boston
University indicated it would back these authors in all
necessary ways. 
After obtaining written permission from all 13
authors submitting articles to the special issue on elec-
tronics, we wrote to Elsevier stating that, “We are hope-
ful that Clapp and Johnson will be successful in placing
their article in another journal, or in yours if Elsevier
will reconsider its position. We will publish when they
publish, wherever that may be. We are standing
together with Clapp and Johnson.”39
The Clinics boycott is only the latest in a series of
censorship disputes involving Elsevier. Recently, 40 sci-
entists accused another Elsevier journal, Regulatory Tox-
icology and Pharmacology, of “corporate conflicts of inter-
est, lack of transparency, and absence of editorial
independence.” The scientists also contended that the
journal “serves as a convenient venue for the publica-
tion of industry research.” The journal had published
papers paid for by the tobacco industry without reveal-
ing this sponsorship and had published numerous
other papers by paid consultants for various industries
without revealing those links.40
THE FINAL DECISION
In March 2006, after more than two years of intimida-
tion and delaying tactics by IBM, plaintiffs in New York
got that state’s court to declare the Clapp and Johnson
study non-confidential. That motion removed any
residual basis for objection to publication of Clapp and
Johnson’s detailed study. The court in New York issued
an injunction prohibiting IBM from interfering with
Dr. Clapp’s efforts to publish his corporate mortality
study. Accordingly, Dr. Clapp submitted his paper and
it was accepted and subsequently published in the peer-
reviewed journal Environmental Health.41 The article has
been accessed over 30,000 times since its publication.
Shortly after the Clapp study was published, Chris
Andrews, a spokesman for IBM, told The Scientist
Clapp’s findings “aren’t credible, nor are they backed
by any kind of legitimate science.” According to
Andrews, the Corporate Mortality File was an “incom-
plete human resources database that IBM used years
ago in conjunction with providing benefits to benefici-
aries of deceased IBM employees. It really contained no
information that would support the study of and the
drawing of scientifically valid conclusions with regard
to diseases among IBM workers.”42 IBM spokesman
Andrews again used the damaging slur that “the latest
study has been discredited as ‘junk science’ and that
other research has shown there is no link. This is prop-
aganda and a fear-driven effort,” referring to the report
and renewed efforts by some former employees to raise
health concerns. “It’s something we take seriously. Our
priority is to work to the highest level of employee
safety. But it’s reasonable to say there are individuals
who have historically drummed up this concern.”43
John Greenagel, a lay spokesman for the Semicon-
ductor Industry Association, said that “the propor-
tional mortality ratio design of Clapp’s study was not a
valid approach to evaluating cancer risks.”42 Greenagel
told USA Today that, “There has not been one scientifi-
cally valid study to show a link to cancer.” He said that
concerns about health issues are in part being
drummed up by organizations seeking to unionize
workers. “There have been activist groups for years.
Their major beef is we’re a non-union industry.”43
CONCLUSION
The past two years of legal delays gave IBM and its con-
sultant epidemiologists the opportunity to conduct and
publish favorable studies of the IBM Corporate Mortal-
ity File, and to present the results in the most acceptable
manner possible to IBM employees and to the public.
During this time, IBM lost no opportunity to challenge
and to denigrate independent attempts to assess its
commitment to occupational health and safety.
The actions of IBM and of Elsevier Science point up
the need for speedy government action to obtain non–
industry-funded studies of many workplace hazards
and a wider commitment of all journals, editors, and
their publishers to ensure that important research find-
ings that may affect public health or social justice reach
both the scientific community and the public as rapidly
as possible. 
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